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This paper examines China’s equity-for-debt swap program through a detailed 
case study of the reform process in one state-owned enterprise. We use a property 
rights conceptual framework to examine the extent to which Asset Management 
Companies have been able to exercise their ownership rights as well as related 
reforms to wage structure, managerial appointments and separation of social welfare 
responsibilities. Our main finding is that the Asset Management Companies have been 
unable to exercise their bundle of ownership rights. On the basis of this finding we 
suggest that it is going to take much longer for the Chinese government to realize its 
objectives compared with many previous debt-workout programs such as Savings and 
Loans reform in the United States.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The equity-for-debt swap (EDS) scheme is one of the most significant recent reform 
initiatives to restructure China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and clear up the bad 
loans of the state-owned banks. The EDS scheme was first announced in 1999 and it 
came into operation in 2000 when the State Council promulgated regulations on the 
operation of the Asset Management Companies (AMCs) (AMC Regulations 2000). 
The four big state-owned banks have each set up one AMC to handle their bad loans.  
The four AMCs are Xinda (attached to China Construction Bank), Great Wall 
(attached to the Agricultural Bank of China), Orient (attached to the Bank of China) 
and Huarong (attached to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). The 
Ministry of Finance has provided each AMC with registered capital of RMB 10 
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billion (AMC Regulations, 2000, Item 5). The State Council appoints the general 
manager and vice-general manager of the AMCs, while the banks provide the other 
staff (AMC Regulations, 2000, Item 8).  
 
While the EDS program is attracting increasing attention in the business literature (see 
eg Steinfeld and Hulme 2000, Zhou 2000, Bonin and Huang 2001, Steinfeld 2001, 
Smyth and Zhai 2002), because it is a recent phenomenon the mechanics of the 
reform are still evolving.  The objective of this paper is to examine recent 
developments in the implementation of the reforms through a detailed case study of 
the EDS in “Northern Shipbuilding”, which is a subsidiary of China Shipbuilding 
Industry Corporation (CSIC).① The case study is based on interviews conducted at 
the firm in October and November 2002. To supplement the information obtained 
from the case study, we also interviewed a representative from Huarong AMC in 
December 2002. This interview was used to supplement the firm interviews and 
update our information on the EDS.  
 
The conceptual framework which we use to analyze the EDS is grounded in the 
property rights literature. The property rights framework proffers that ownership 
consists of a bundle of rights such as control rights, right to receive a dividend and the 
right to transfer shares to third parties (see eg Comisso 1991, Yang 1993, Smyth 1998). 
The state-owned banks and AMCs have a good bank-bad bank relationship.  The 
AMCs purchase the designated debt of the state-owned bank with which they are 
paired at face value. In order to pay for the debt the AMCs issue bonds to the banks at 
par value.  After the debt owing to the bank is converted into equity, the AMC 
becomes a shareholder in the debtor enterprise.  This gives the AMC ownership 
rights in the firm. Our approach is to examine to what extent the AMCs in Northern 
Shipbuilding can exercise their bundle of rights. The balance of the paper is set out as 
follows. The next section provides a brief review of progress with the reforms.  
Section three presents the case study of the EDS in Northern Shipbuilding. We first 
describe the mechanics of the EDS in the firm and then examine whether the AMCs 
can exercise an effective bundle of ownership rights.  
 
Foreshadowing our main findings, while the AMCs involved in the swap are receiving 
a nominal dividend, the control rights of the AMCs are curtailed and the prospects for 
transferring their shares to third parties in the short-term are limited.  On the basis of 
this finding we suggest that it is going to take much longer for the Chinese 
government to realize its objectives compared with debt-workout programs such as 
Savings and Loans reform in the United States. While western commentators are often 
critical of the seeming failure of the EDS program to move faster, we stress the need 
to see the EDS in the context of the social and political realities of enterprise reform 
in China.  
 
2. Objectives and Progress with the Equity-for Debt Swaps 
 
AMCs in other countries have been set up for a range of reasons.  These include (a) 
privatization of government owned banks; (b) restructuring of distressed, although 
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viable financial institutions and (c) the disposition of insolvent assets from non-viable 
financial institutions (Klingebiel 2001, Sundarajan and Seelig 2001).  The United 
States Resolution Trust Company (RTC), which was established in the 1990s to deal 
with the Savings and Loans crisis, is an instance of (c).  The Chinese AMCs are a 
mixture of (b) and (c) (Smyth and Zhai, 2002).  The EDS in China has three 
objectives. The first is to improve the performance of SOEs participating in the 
scheme and provide a basis for ownership diversification through transferring a 
bundle of ownership rights to AMCs. The second is to reduce the debt levels of SOEs 
and turn those firms participating in the scheme from loss-makers to profit makers.  
The third objective is to enable the banks to improve their balance sheets through 
selling bad debts to the AMCs attached to them.   
 
Three important differences between China’s EDS and the United States (RTC) are 
worth highlighting (see Bonin and Huang 2001 for more details).  One major 
difference between China’s EDS and the Savings and Loans reforms in the United 
States is that in the latter financial markets were well developed with a lot of 
institutional investors. In China the capital markets are not large enough to handle the 
size of the bad debts and most investors are individuals who are unable to judge the 
risks involved with purchasing low quality assets. Second, the RTC was established to 
deal mainly with real estate loans from Savings and Loans which had ceased to 
operate as independent entities.  Thus, there was no new flow of bad loans.  In 
contrast, in China, the state banks are still lending and continuing to accrue bad loans.  
Third, in the United States as in some Central Eastern European countries which have 
used debt-workout programs such as the Czech Republic, a substantial proportion of 
the transferred loans were good loans, while in China all of the assets transferred to 
the AMCs have been non-performing loans. 
 
In China the composition and volume of the debt to be swapped is decided by the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in consultation with the Ministry of 
Finance. The debt must be owed to one of the four main commercial banks or to the 
State Development Bank.  The regulations explicitly exclude debts owing to other 
financial institutions such as credit cooperatives and investment trust companies. The 
SETC recommends to the AMCs which enterprises should be involved in the EDS. 
The regulations governing the operation of the AMCs state that the AMCs are to 
evaluate each of the recommended firms independently and that the AMCs sign the 
EDS with the enterprise (AMC Regulations 2000, Item 18). When the EDS scheme 
was announced, 2000 of China’s large and medium-sized SOEs applied (Steinfeld, 
2001).  The SETC selected 601 mainly “key” SOEs in the initial round. The total 
value of the debt of the 601 enterprises involved in the swap is RMB 400-500 billion, 
which was about 50 per cent of the outstanding loans of the banking sector at the end 
of 1997 (Huang 2001). 
 
At the end of 2001, the official estimate was that non-performing loans held by 
Chinese banks were worth 1.8 trillion RMB ($US 217 billion) or 25.4 per cent of 
bank lending (Xinhua News Agency 2002). However, an Ernst & Young study 
estimates that the total value of unprofitable loans to be $US 480 billion or 44 per cent 
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of bank lending (Chandler 2002). A total of 1.4 trillion RMB ($US 170 billion) was 
transferred to the four AMCs in the first round (Tam 2002). In November 2002 the 
State Council announced that it was considering a second transfer of non-performing 
loans to AMCs.  At the time of the announcement, Wang Weiwei, Deputy Director 
General of Economic Restructuring in the State Council stated that the scale of the 
second swap would not be larger than the first transfer which commenced in 1999 
(Kynge 2002). 
 
It is important to realize that not all of the assets which AMCs hold are acquired 
through EDS.  At the end of 1999 Huarong held 100 billion RMB, for which it 
issued bonds to the Industrial and Commercial Bank at face value under the EDS 
program. It also held a further 300 billion RMB worth of bad loans, which it 
purchased from the Industrial and Commercial Bank at a discount to par.  In the 
latter case, the amount which it paid for the bad loans depended on the quality of the 
assets. Huarong has paid up to 90 per cent of face value to purchase bad loans, but the 
most common value is 30 per cent of the face value of the asset.①  The distinction 
between equity acquired at par under the EDS scheme and bad loans purchased at a 
discount is important because the rights which are conferred differ. When debt is 
purchased at par under the EDS program, the AMCs get a bundle of ownership rights. 
However with bad loans purchased at a discount the AMCs do not get the right to 
participate in the running of the enterprise, but only acquire the right to collect the 
loan through liquidating the asset or selling it to third parties. 
 
At the end of September 2002, the four AMCs had disposed of bad loans worth 232.3 
billion RMB ($US 28.09 billion). Of the bad loans disposed to September 2002, the 
four AMCs recovered 84.6 billion RMB ($US 10.2 billion), which is a recovery rate 
of 36.4 per cent.  Of this amount, 52.5 billion RMB ($US 6.3 billion) was in cash, 
which represents a cash recovery rate of 22.6 per cent. Huarong has the highest cash 
recovery rate on bad loans among the four AMCs.  In Huarong, the cash recovery 
rate on its 300 billion RMB worth of bad loans since 1999 has been about 30 per 
cent.② 
 
However, the return on the debt converted to equity under the EDS is not as good.  
Of the 100 billion RMB purchased by Huarong from the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank at face value under the EDS program, about 0.5 per cent has been sold to third 
parties. Moreover, out of the 500 million RMB that has been sold to third parties, less 
than 10 per cent has been sold to foreign investors.③ Most foreign investors are only 
interested in industries with growth potential, such as computers, electronics, food 
processing and telecommunications, and in assets in large and medium-sized cities.  
The reason it is difficult for the AMCs to sell debt/equity acquired under the EDS 
program is that it must be sold at par, unless the AMC gets special permission from 
the Ministry of Finance.  
 
One innovative development, which Huarong has pioneered is to put together asset 
packages to sell to foreign investors. Huarong has a good relationship with the top 
five international accounting firms, who have assisted it to price the asset packages. In 
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November 2001 Huarong AMC sold asset packages to international investment 
consortiums led by Morgan Stanley (with a face value of 10.8 billion RMB) and 
Goldman Sachs (with a face value of 1.97 billion RMB) (Kynge, 2002a, Xinhua News 
Agency 2002a). Most of these assets were bad loans, which Huarong had purchased at 
a discount to par, but there were also some assets, which it had acquired at face value 
under the EDS with the Industrial and Commercial Bank.①  The overall return on 
these asset packages was slightly less than 10 per cent of face value (Kynge 2002a). 
At the same time as selling the assets, Huarong signed separate agreements with the 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs consortiums to set up joint ventures to dispose of 
the assets.  Morgan Stanley proposed a two-tier structure, consisting of a joint 
venture that owns the debts and an offshore entity that charges a service fee to dispose 
of the assets (McGregor 2002). The problem was that there was no precedent for the 
establishment of a joint venture such as this to collect bad debts in China. This caused 
a delay of just over 12 months before the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) gave approval for the joint ventures to proceed in December 
2002 (Kynge 2002a). 
 
Huarong also provides management consulting services for firms in which it holds 
shares.  This includes packaging companies for listing on the stock market and 
acting as an underwriter for stock market listing.② Great Wall and Xinda AMCs are 
following Huarong’s lead. In April 2002 Great Wall auctioned 15 billion RMB worth 
of bad loans to international investors. Xinda has signed an agreement with Goldman 
Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Lonestar Capital to dispose of bad loans from the China 
Construction Bank. Xinda has also applied to the Central Bank for permission to pack 
up better quality assets for securitization.  It wants to pledge indebted assets as bonds 
in enterprises which report good cash flow in the water, power and transport 
industries (McGregor, 2002). 
 
3. Case Study of the Equity-for-Debt Swap in Northern Shipbuilding 
 
3.1 Background and Methodology 
 
Northern Shipbuilding was established at the beginning of the 1990s and became a 
subsidiary of CSIC in 1999. In 2001, it was among the five largest shipbuilding 
companies in China in terms of exports, jobs completed and output value and the 10 
largest shipbuilding companies in China in terms of new orders received (British 
Embassy 2002). In terms of sales revenue it ranks between the 200th and 300th biggest 
SOE in China (SSB, various and firm interviews). We conducted multiple in-depth 
interviews with a member of the senior management group of Northern Shipbuilding, 
who was in charge of economic restructuring in the firm in October/November 2002.  
These interviews were supplemented with a further interview with the financial 
manager who was in charge of the EDS in the firm. The questions were supplied to 
the firm in advance of the interviews and we were provided with written responses to 
those questions before the interviews took place.  The interviews were therefore used 
to get clarification on issues that were unclear as well as seek further elaboration on 
the written answers. The information below on Northern Shipbuilding is based on the 
                                                        
① Interview at Huarong AMC, December 2002. 
② Interview at Huarong AMC, December 2002. 
 109
interviews conducted at the firm and material supplied by the firm unless indicated 
otherwise. 
 
Northern Shipbuilding is typical of many large firms in the shipbuilding sector and 
state sector more generally.  In 2001 it had approximately 4500 formal employees 
and another 5000-6000 contract workers. It resembles a large diversified manufacturer.  
Apart from shipbuilding, ship repair and marine products, Northern Shipbuilding 
produces large-scale steel structures for high buildings and bridges. Case studies of 
large SOEs suggest that surplus labour between 10 and 60 per cent of the workforce 
in the state sector is common (Morris et al, 2001 pp. 699-700). At the interviews we 
were told that at Northern Shipbuilding administrative/managerial staff could be 
reduced by one-half to two-thirds and production workers could be reduced by 
one-half without a fall in output. In common with many large SOEs, the firm has also 
shouldered a large social welfare burden, which is considered in more detail below.  
The debt levels in the firm prior to the swap were a bit higher than the average for 
large SOEs, but are fairly typical of the shipbuilding industry. In 1999, prior to the 
EDS the debt-asset ratio of the firm was 94 per cent.  Subsequent to the EDS, the 
debt-asset ratio fell to 65 per cent.   
 
3.2 Situation Before the EDS 
 
From the start of the 1990s up until 1994 the firm made a small annual profit and 
experienced stable growth in sales revenue. During this period, the firm had one 
Slipway, which meant that it could only build one ship at a time. However, at the end 
of 1994 there was a change in the leadership of the firm and a Dry Dock was 
constructed in addition to the existing Slipway.  It was possible to produce two ships 
at the one time in the Dry Dock. Therefore, there was an increase from one production 
line (on the Slipway) to three production lines (one on the Slipway and two in the Dry 
Dock). With the installation of the Dry Dock, similar to other SOEs at the time, the 
new leadership focused on maximizing output without much attention to cost or profit 
considerations.① 
 
With three production lines Northern Shipbuilding signed contracts for the delivery of 
several ships in short sequence.  According to the contracts, each ship had to be 
delivered at six-month intervals. This resulted in chaos on the production lines and 
created several problems. First, in order to operate the three production lines 
simultaneously and attempt to meet the contract deadlines, the firm had to borrow to 
bring delivery of the second and third ships forward. As the interest rate at the time 
was high (around 10 per cent per annum), the total cost of the borrowing was about 25 
million RMB per annum. Second, the firm could not match production schedules with 
delivery targets. As a result, some ships were built ahead of the scheduled time, while 
some were well behind schedule and, in the case of these ships, the firm had to pay 
penalties on late deliveries.  Third, in order to meet the extra production, the firm 
was forced to hire more contract workers.  Most of the contract workers came from 
outsourcing teams. According to the National Regulations contract workers cannot 
mix with formal employees in the firm, so outsourcing teams had to be brought in for 
entire jobs. Before 1995 Northern Shipbuilding had three outsourcing teams, but after 
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1995 this figure increased to 10. 
 
The firm continued to make small profits in 1995 and 1996, but the focus on 
maximizing output combined with the effects of the Asian financial crisis meant that 
the firm made a substantial loss for the first time in its history in 1997. Following the 
Asian Financial Crisis there was a 20 per cent drop in world shipping prices. This had 
little or no effect on South Korean shipbuilders, who along with Japanese shipbuilders 
are China’s main competitors. This is because the Won depreciated significantly 
relative to the US dollar over the same period, while the RMB has been stable relative 
to the US dollar. After the Asian Financial Crisis, Northern Shipbuilding took no 
orders for several months and experienced slow business for at least two full years.  
At the end of 1999, it had two long-term loans denominated in RMB with the State 
Development Bank and the Construction Bank and one long-term loan from the Bank 
of China, which was denominated in Yen.  
 
3.3 The Mechanics of the EDS 
 
In November 1999, CSIC and Northern Shipbuilding signed a preliminary EDS with 
the State Development Bank and the Orient, Huarong and Xinda Asset AMCs. 
Huarong was involved in the EDS because Northern Shipbuilding had some bad 
current loans from the Industrial and Commercial Bank, although they had no 
long-term loans. Theoretically only long-term loans are included in EDS, but in 
practice some current loans have also been swapped. While the loans with the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank were listed as current loans, in practice they were 
used for construction and infrastructure purposes and thus qualified for the EDS. The 
first shareholders coordination meeting was held in December 1999, where a working 
group was established.  The EDS agreement was formally signed in March 2000, at 
which time it was approved by the State Council. 
 
Table 1 shows the debt transferred in the swap.  All of the debt owing to the State 
Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank and the Construction Bank was 
transferred into equity owned by their paired AMCs.  However, not all of the debt 
owing to the Bank of China, which is paired with Orient, was due.  Thus, only loans 
that were due were included in the EDS. Table 2 shows the shares and seats on the 
Board of Directors and Supervision Committee of each of the parties following the 
EDS.  There are 13 seats on the Board of Directors. The seats, which each of the 
parties hold on the Board is proportional with their equity in the firm as shareholders. 
There are seven seats on the Supervision Committee. On the Supervision Committee 
each of the parties (including CSIC) holds one seat, except Northern Shipbuilding, 
which holds two seats.  
 
CSIC and Northern Shipbuilding hold six seats on the Board between them and 
provide the Chairman. However, prior to the EDS, Northern Shipbuilding’s net assets 
were initially valued at approximately 600 million RMB.  This was not enough to 
give CSIC and Northern Shipbuilding control of the Board.①  The total area of the 
land on which Northern Shipbuilding is located, which CSIC owns and which it 
leased to Northern Shipbuilding in return for rent is 1.14 million square metres.  To 
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ensure CSIC and Northern Shipbuilding maintained control of the Board, CSIC 
included 300,000 square metres of this land as part of the assets of Northern 
Shipbuilding prior to the EDS.  This means that CSIC no longer receive rent on this 
300,000 square metres, but instead receive a dividend on their shareholding, along 
with the other shareholders, provided that the firm makes a profit.  Theoretically 
CSIC could continue to cede land to Northern Shipbuilding to inflate its shareholding.  
CSIC, though, can get a higher and guaranteed return on the land if they lease it to 
Northern Shipbuilding.  Thus, as long as CSIC maintains control of the Board, it 
does not want to include more land in the EDS. 
 
3.4. The AMCs’ Bundle of Ownership Rights 
 
As discussed in the introduction, as part of the EDS, AMCs are supposed to receive a 
bundle of ownership rights.  The main ownership rights, which are conferred on 
AMCs are control rights, the right to receive a dividend and the right to transfer their 
equity to third parties.  Here we examine whether, and to what extent, each of these 
bundle of ownership rights can be exercised by the AMCs in Northern Shipbuilding. 
 
The AMC provisions state: “The AMC as a shareholder of the enterprise can send 
people to join the board of directors and supervision committee and enforce its rights 
as a shareholder” (AMC Regulations, 2000, Item 20). In theory, the shareholders and 
the Board sit at the top of the decision-making tree (Production Bureau of National 
Reform Committee, 1999). However, in practice, it is the government which 
continues to appoint senior management in large SOEs and outside shareholders 
cannot interfere in the day-to-day management of the firm.  Even in cases where the 
AMCs own the majority of the shares they will typically not interfere in the 
day-to-day management of the firm.  Generally the input of the AMCs is restricted to 
decisions regarding the policy direction of the enterprise.①  In fact Huarong has 
downsized its EDS division, focusing instead on collecting and packaging bad loans. 
The reason is that most of the work in the EDS division is completed in a three-month 
period each year when representatives from Huarong attend Board meetings. But 
because Huarong does not participate in day-to-day management, there is little for its 
EDS division to do at other times of the year.② 
 
At Northern Shipbuilding, one effect of the EDS is that the decision-making structure 
has become more formalized.  Since the EDS, decisions are taken through the Board 
of Directors and Supervisory Committee.  Hence, it can be argued that the 
governance structure has improved. If CSIC and the AMCs are in dispute, the parties 
will first attempt to negotiate a solution informally in a shareholders coordination 
meeting, but if no solution can be reached there will be a formal vote through the 
Board of Directors. 
 
The AMCs can exercise their voting rights through the Board of Directors; however, 
in practice their influence is limited on most decisions because they lack expertise in 
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the shipbuilding industry.①  For this reason, the view was expressed in the interviews 
at Northern Shipbuilding that the Directors appointed by the AMCs are not as 
influential as the Directors appointed by CSIC and the firm itself.  Most of the time 
the AMCs just vote for the proposals which CSIC puts forward.  The attitude of 
Huarong is representative of the other AMCs involved in the EDS.  The 
representative from Huarong whom we interviewed pointed out that Huarong is 
involved in approximately 500 EDS, which are spread over several industries and that 
it does not have the time or expertise to be involved in the management of the 
enterprises in which it is a shareholder.②  
 
There are two issues on which the AMCs have outvoted CSIC. One issue concerned a 
management fee, which CSIC collected from Northern Shipbuilding prior to the EDS 
with the sanction of the taxation office.  Following the EDS, the AMCs considered 
that CSIC, as just one shareholder, should not continue to collect a management fee 
from the firm at the expense of the other shareholders.  Thus, in 2001 the other 
Directors voted against CSIC getting a management fee and now CSIC no longer 
collects the fee. 
 
The other issue concerned a proposal by Northern Shipbuilding not to allocate 
dividends in 2000-01. This is because the firm was not performing well following the 
Asian Financial Crisis, although it still made a small profit in that financial year. The 
AMCs voted against that proposal, with the result that a nominal amount of dividends 
were paid. At the interview we conducted at Huarong we were told that getting firms 
to pay some dividends is one issue on which the AMCs have exercised their 
ownership rights.  The representative from Huarong pointed out that in order to 
avoid paying dividends, companies will often fiddle with the balance sheet to conceal 
that they are making a profit.  The AMCs are well aware of this, such that the 
veracity of the balance sheet is one aspect of firms’ operations to which the AMCs 
pay particular attention.③  
 
The AMCs at Northern Shipbuilding intend to sell their shares to third parties if 
possible and we were told at the interviews that some potential purchasers had shown 
an interest. Northern Shipbuilding would like what was described as a “powerful 
shareholder” to purchase the AMCs’ shares, preferably, in an allied industry such as 
shipping, which would provide raw materials, new technologies and guaranteed 
orders.  One of the big international shipping companies would fit this bill, but it will 
be difficult for the AMCs to sell their shares to overseas investors who generally 
would want a controlling interest.  It seems unlikely that CSIC would countenance 
giving up its controlling interest in the firm.  In this respect, it has priority in 
purchasing shares from the AMCs, which it can exercise if it looks like losing its 
controlling interest. At the same time, there are few opportunities for the AMCs to sell 
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③ Interview at Huarong AMC, December 2002. 
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their interests to non-state enterprises in China because it is difficult for such firms to 
invest in a shipbuilding firm the size of Northern Shipbuilding given the capital 
expenditure needed.   Thus, unless the AMCs were to sell their shares to another 
SOE, which would defeat the ultimate object of ownership diversification, the 
prospects for the AMCs to exit the firm in the short-term are slim. 
 
3.5.  Enterprise Reforms Since the EDS 
 
The AMC regulations provide that “after the EDS, the enterprise should change its 
operation mechanism according to the requirements of the modern enterprise.  The 
management should be improved and the local government should help the enterprise 
to reduce its number of workers and separate its social welfare functions” (AMC 
Regulations, 2000, Item 19). Candidates for the EDS were required to give a plan to 
the SETC prior to the swap for reforming their management mechanism and wage 
structure and following the EDS, the local committee of the SETC oversees its 
implementation.  
 
Management and Wage Reform 
 
As part of the plan put forward to the SETC to be given permission to undertake the 
EDS, Northern Shipbuilding proposed that it would reform the wage structure within 
the firm. Since the EDS was completed, in addition to wage reform, Northern 
Shipbuilding has also introduced open competition for managerial positions. The 
reforms are linked. Introducing competition for managerial positions is seen as an 
important step towards wage reform because workers are less likely to resist the idea 
of the firm paying higher salaries to management if they are given the opportunity to 
compete for the positions. 
 
In Northern Shipbuilding each manager receives an annual performance assessment 
conducted by the human resources department and a supervisor’s assessment 
conducted by the manager’s supervisor.  Since the EDS, all managerial positions are 
thrown open to competition in March each year, once the results for the previous year 
are known. In theory, anyone within the firm who satisfies the minimum criteria in 
terms of age, experience and qualification can apply for a managerial position in the 
open competition. However, in practice the real competition for positions will be 
restricted to those where the manager fails his/her annual assessment and/or 
supervisor’s assessment. Northern Shipbuilding has also used the introduction of 
competition to restructure the firm.  Thus, there have been a series of department 
mergers and the firm has introduced semi-retirement arrangements for older managers 
approaching retirement age. The annual turnover of management, due to poor 
performance and restructuring of managerial positions in the short period since the 
reforms were introduced has been 10-15 per cent.  
 
In Northern Shipbuilding wages consist of four components: (i) position wage, (ii) 
experience wage, (iii) skill subsidy and (iv) bonus. Following the EDS the coefficient 
bands for the position wage component were widened between positions in order to 
reward better performance.  The base wage for the position component is 800 RMB 
per month, which has a coefficient of 1. Following the EDS the coefficient bands are 
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as follows: General Manager (5-6.5), Deputy General Manager (4-5.25), head of a 
major department (3-4), head of a lesser department (2.6-3.5), supervisor of a 
workshop (2-3.5) and technical workers (1-1.75). For service workers the coefficient 
band varies between 0.75 and 1.5. The position within the band is assessed each 
month according to targets. 
 
Production workers are paid on a piece-wage basis. The firm allocates a fixed number 
of hours per job and assigns a unit price to each job. The number of hours allocated to 
each job is reviewed from time to time according to whether production targets are 
being met.  For jobs related to shipbuilding the unit price is 9.6 RMB per hour, while 
for all other jobs it is 5.6 RMB per hour.  If the job is completed within the allocated 
time to the required standard, workers will receive the full amount for the job 
(allocated hours per job times unit price) and can move on to the next job.  The norm 
is for production workers to work 176 hours per month, but some work up to 250 
hours per month. 
 
Following the wage reform, wages in Northern Shipbuilding are now in the medium 
to high range for its location. Prior to adjusting their position wage, the firm lost some 
designing staff and production managers to foreign-owned companies. However, 
since the reforms to the position wage, designing staff in Northern Shipbuilding can 
now earn 2,500-3,000 RMB per month all up plus receiving a further 40 per cent of 
their wage in social welfare benefits.  Taking social welfare benefits into account, 
this amount is roughly comparable to what can be earned in foreign-owned companies 
where the monthly wage is about 4000-5000 RMB per month.  Given that SOEs, 
such as Northern Shipbuilding, generally have more flexible working arrangements 
than foreign-owned firms, since the wage reforms some designing staff have even 
returned to the firm. 
 
Separation of Social Welfare Functions 
 
Northern Shipbuilding started to separate its social welfare functions in the mid-1990s.  
Until the mid-1990s the firm operated a childcare centre in the factory and a 
kindergarten in the residential area for use by its employees.  The cost to the firm of 
offering these services was about 500,000 RMB per annum.  These were closed in 
1995-96 and, as compensation, Northern Shipbuilding introduced one year paid 
maternity leave (without annual bonus). Northern Shipbuilding established a bus route 
in 1990 because there was no public transport for workers to get to the firm. It had to 
transport 3000 workers to the firm in the morning, for which it had to purchase 20 to 
30 buses. The firm thought that it could recoup some of the costs through charging 
workers a fare and running the bus service at other times of the day.  However, it was 
making a loss of 900,000 RMB per annum and in 1999 just prior to the EDS it was 
transferred to the municipal government. 
 
The process of separating social welfare functions has continued since the EDS. 
Northern Shipbuilding owns a hotel, which it built for 30 million RMB between 1995 
and 1997.  The hotel was losing 1 million RMB per annum.  In 2000, it was merged 
with one of the firm’s service companies, which supplies marine transport equipment.  
The reason for the merger was that the hotel was loss making, while the marine 
transport company was profitable.  Northern Shipbuilding is currently negotiating 
with the municipal government to separate its junior secondary school.  The problem 
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is that the municipal government wants the firm to transfer all of the school’s assets, 
make an initial lump-sum payment of 6 million RMB and pay an annual subsidy 
starting at 1.2 million RMB to be phased out over 10 years.  The employees of 
Northern Shipbuilding are also opposed to transferring the school because it is 
currently regarded as a good quality junior secondary school with a high proportion of 
students gaining access to “key” secondary schools. 
 
Raising Funds Since the Swap 
 
After the EDS, the debt-asset ratio fell almost 30 per cent.  This has made the firm 
an attractive lending proposition for the banks.  Steinfeld (2001) notes that this is a 
common occurrence with the local branches of major state banks lining up to extend 
new loans to SOEs that have undergone EDS.  He points out that there are several 
reasons for this phenomenon. First, banks want to lend to firms which have undergone 
EDS because they have been through an official vetting process and, hence, have the 
imprimatur of the state.  Second, the debt-asset ratio in firms that have undergone 
EDS has fallen, so the banks consider them safer bets.  Third, because AMCs have 
large financial obligations to the banks, the banks do not want the firms with which 
the AMCs are involved to get into financial difficulties in the short-term because of 
cash-flow problems. 
 
Northern Shipbuilding has received preferential support for four projects since the 
debt-equity swap. First, it received funding for developing new technologies worth 
300 million RMB over the period 1999-2002, made up of bank loans, interest 
subsidies from the government and contributions from CSIC.  A second project for 
new product development worth 140 million RMB started in 2000 consisting of bank 
loans and government subsidies.  Third, Northern Shipbuilding received a further 
200 million RMB in 2001 from the SETC for new product development.  The fourth 
project is funding to improve infrastructure capacity, which was approved in 2002.  
The total value of this project is 260 million RMB, made up of bank loans and 
contributions from CSIC. 
 
In 2004-05, the projected debt of Northern Shipbuilding will be 600-800 million 
RMB.  At this time, the firm expects to complete all the projects and start repaying 
the debt, with the objective of paying it off by 2008.  To achieve this, it would need 
to pay off 120 million RMB per annum, but the problem is that the firm’s annual 
profit is only 40-60 million RMB.  Thus, the firm cannot afford to service the debt. 
At the time of the interviews, it was considering two options to address this issue.  
The first is to get foreign investment.  It was negotiating with a United States firm 
that was interested in investing in its marine engineering technologies.  The second 
was to list on the stock market. 
 
While Northern Shipbuilding is still weighing up the pros and cons of listing on the 
stock market, it has decided against it at this stage.  If it were to list, the listing price 
and thus the amount of capital it could raise would depend on the firm’s profitability.  
To list at a price which was high enough to raise the funds to retire the debt, its profits 
would need to be about 160 million RMB per annum.  The only way it could achieve 
this would be to inflate the profits of the listed subsidiary through directing revenue to 
the listed subsidiary and costs to the non-listed subsidiary.  The problem, though, is 
that the tax levied on profits is 33 per cent.  If the listed company was making 160 
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million RMB per annum, it would have to pay 53 million RMB per annum in taxation, 
while interest repayments on the debt accrued under the four projects is 30 million 
RMB per annum. 
 
4. Conclusions from the Case Study 
 
On the plus side the EDS in Northern Shipbuilding has acted as a catalyst for some related reforms 
to management and wages in the sense that the AMC regulations specified that labour market 
reforms were a precondition for the firm participating in the EDS program.  These reforms have 
made the firm more competitive in attracting and maintaining skilled labour. However, the four 
new projects, which Northern Shipbuilding have started since the EDS suggest that the EDS may 
have done nothing to change the soft credit mentality that run up huge debts prior to the swap. If 
the firm cannot service the debt, it is likely that the firm will accrue further bad debts, ultimately 
muddying the good-bank-bad-bank relationship. The reforms have also done little to facilitate 
restructuring and ownership diversification. While there are now formal Board meetings, the 
AMCs in Northern Shipbuilding have only received a limited bundle of ownership rights. The 
AMCs have outvoted CSIC to ensure that they get a nominal dividend, but the extent to which 
they can exercise control rights is impaired by a lack of industry knowledge and there are limited 
prospects for transferring shares in the short term.  
 
The failure to push the reforms through faster has to be seen in the context of social 
and political realities facing the reform process in China.  In the mid-to-late 1990s 
the State Commission for Economic Restructuring estimated that the number of 
surplus workers in SOEs was about half the total workforce (Morris et al 2001, p. 
699). The EDS has done little to reduce the prevalence of surplus labour in Northern 
Shipbuilding with the AMCs unable to scale-back employment. Western 
commentators on the EDS often express exasperation that the AMCs have been 
unable to address the surplus labour problem.  Steinfeld’s view is a common one 
when he states: “Unfortunately, nothing in the debt-equity restructuring arrangement 
addresses the fundamental problem [of surplus labour]” (Steinfeld 2001, p. 17). 
However, it is also important to recognize that the socio-economic sensitivities 
involved in restructuring are major constraints on the reforms.  The shock to society 
with China’s EDS program has been deliberately designed to be smaller compared 
with other forms of debt-workout such as asset liquidation, which would involve 
large-scale redundancies (Huang, 2001, Smyth and Zhai, 2002). 
 
The regulations governing the operation of the AMCs provide for a ten-year 
timeframe for the AMCs. The obvious conclusion from the case study is that given the 
slow progress to this point with transferring shares to third parties, the process of 
ownership diversification is going to take much longer than ten years. Against this 
backdrop, the challenge for the Chinese authorities is to get the speed of reform right. 
It is a delicate balancing act. The reforms cannot be pushed through to fast. The 
number of laid-off workers already represents a major social problem in China. 
According to official figures there were 26 million workers laid-off from SOEs 
between 1998 and 2002 (Armitage, 2003). China’s embryonic social security system 
would be unable to cope with redundancies on the scale that would occur if all the 
surplus workers in large SOEs such as Northern Shipbuilding were laid-off.  If this 
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were to occur, social stability would be potentially threatened.  At the same time, if 
the reforms are to slow and the AMCs continue to take a backseat indefinitely it is 
likely that the banks and firms will treat the EDS as a free lunch, further bad debts 
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Debt Transferred in the Debt-Equity Swap at Northern Shipbuilding  
(Units 10,000 RMB) 
 
Creditor Item Debt Debt Transferred Remaining Debt 
Total 42691 42691  
Capital 41100 41100  
State 
Development 
Bank Interest 1591 1591  
Total 30029 30029  
Capital 26750 26750  
Xinda AMC 
Interest 3279 3279  
Total 20000 20000  
Capital 20000 20000  
Huarong AMC 
Interest    
Total 25530 14793 10737 (a) 
Capital 24919 14182 10737 
Orient AMC 
Interest 611 611  
 
Notes: (a) Not all of the debt owing to the Bank of China, which is 
paired with Orient, was due.  Only loans that were due are included in 
the debt-equity swap. 




Equity and Seats on the Board of Directors and Supervision Committee at 




Seats Held on the 
Board of Directors 
Seats Held on the 
Supervision Committee 
State Development Bank 426.91 3 1 
Xinda AMC 300.29 2 1 
Huarong AMC 200.00 1 1 
Orient 147.93 1 1 
CSIC (including land) 796.15 2 1 
Northern Shipbuilding  4 (including chairman) 2 
Total 1871.28 13 7 
 
Source: Materials Supplied by Northern Shipbuilding. 
